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Introduction
Individual households save out of income by postponing consumption. Individual households aim 
to get a positive reward for such savings after inflation. The decision to save out of their disposable 
income is one made by the collective of individual households. 
The real question about savings is not so much what individual households do -though important-, 
but what the users of the savings do with the money.  Do such savings reach the companies or 
individuals which need the savings to expand production or consumption, or are savings allocated 
to applications which impede this purpose? The difference is the difference between the economic 
use of savings and the financial one.
The  allocation  of  savings  over  their  various  uses  is  rarely  made  by  individual  households 
themselves.  Governments  decide  over  their  own budgets  and deficit  funding.  Government  debt 
outstanding for longer than a year does no longer contribute to economic growth. Many companies 
-especially the bigger ones- attract  equity resources from capital  markets.  This is a category of 
savings which directly supports economic growth. However when the shares are listed any increase 
in share price benefits the sellers of the shares, but the companies do not receive a single penny 
more.  The increase  in  price  is  funded from savers,  but  is  not  returned to  either  consumers  or  
producers; it is usually kept in financial claims on banks or other financial institutions like pension 
funds. The third category is funding house price increases. When individual households’ incomes 
rise,  so may house prices. However when house prices increase faster than the average income 
growth,  additional  savings  are  being  pumped  into  house  price  rises  which  are  not  based  on a 
transfer to home builders. Such house price increases are also not based on the original building 
costs corrected for inflation levels. The sellers may be the beneficiaries, but the buyers have to 
allocate  additional  savings  which  do  nothing  for  creating  economic  growth.  All  these  savings 
applications are examples of the financial use of savings rather than an economic one.
Another question needs to be raised: Can individual households collectively save too much and 
thereby consume too little in certain periods? The answer is a resounding yes as the U.S. experience 
has shown since 2008. The threat of losing one’s home in a declining house price period or losing 
one’s job made individual households reduce their national home mortgage portfolio by about 10% 
or $1.2 trillion over the period 2008-Q2 2013. Secondly the structure of current day savings patterns 
makes access to such savings much less flexible.  In many cases the management  of individual 
savings is outsourced to external institutions.  
When considering savings, one has also to consider the events which lead to the destruction of 
existing savings. Lower company profit levels and company failures, bank failures, drops in share, 
bond and house prices all lead to losses on savings which undermine the hopes for a positive return 
on savings.
The collective economic risks to the savings levels of individual households are unevenly spread 
over the households. Young people and lower wage earners represent the households which suffer 
most  from economic  downturns.  These  groups  use  borrowed  funds  to  achieve  the  dreams  of 
acquiring a home and other economic essentials. These groups are also the most vulnerable to a 
disruption in the income earning capacity as debts do not disappear in a recession period. In the 
upturn they benefit the least as their volume of savings is the lowest among all households. It is for 
this reason that the focus of this paper is on the Euro area, where youth unemployment rates are at 
historical highs, where share prices are still far below 2008 levels and where house prices have hit a 
seven year low. The savings allocation needs re-balancing towards an economic use.
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1 The Coin economic theory
1.1 Savings not used for output and employment growth: the financial use of savings
The Coin economic theory, which stands for the economic activities of the collective of individual 
households, starts from the premise that only individuals are the ultimate earners, spenders and 
savers of incomes. The institutions such as a government, a central bank, banks, pension funds and 
industrial and service sector companies are all made up of individuals in different capacities. 
In these different capacities, the collective of individual households distinguishes itself from the rest 
of the living creatures by using money as the tool to enable each institution to function and to help 
each  individual  household  to  earn  an  income.  For  many  Euro  area  countries  the  youth 
unemployment figures show that this process operates in a less than satisfactory manner. Since the 
2008 financial crisis, the income growth in average earnings for the employed workers has fallen 
behind  the  rate  of  inflation  in  many  countries:  another  unsatisfactory  result.  Thirdly  with 
government  deficits  increasing,  quite  a  few  governments  have  tried  to  rectify  their  deficit  by 
increasing the average tax level, rather than by the more difficult route of reducing government 
expenditure.  Fourthly  banks,  which  had  lend  money  to  individual  households  at  a  speed  far 
exceeding the income growth levels, especially for the purpose of home buying, had to face the 
consequences of their collective actions. They had to retrench or even needed to be bailed out by the 
collective of individual households.
What is most striking is the apparent lack of understanding of the links between savings as a source 
of creating more jobs and better incomes and savings which are used to inflate share, bond and 
house prices. Also the process of the destruction of savings values is not properly addressed in 
economic theories.
Take the case of government debt funding. In the year  that a government spends more than its  
revenues  level,  the  borrowings  for  such  spending  represent  a  conversion  of  savings  into 
consumption. However just like individual household debt, in the following years such government 
debt from previous years needs to be funded, it requires an allocation of savings which does no 
longer  contribute  to  consumption  or  investment  for  that  matter.  The  savings  are  stuck  in  the 
financial sector only. It is the equivalent of keeping a “coin” in one’s pocket; it does not add value 
to consumption or production any longer. Hence the term: “Coin economic theory”, which stands 
for both the Collective of Individual households as well as the process of keeping savings: “Coins”, 
in applications  which do not contribute to output and employment  growth: the financial  use of 
savings. 
In  case  a  government  does  not  expand  or  reduce  its  debts,  the  debt  servicing  means  that  the 
collective of individual households pays the interest due out of incomes and that the holders of the 
government debt, such as banks and pension funds receive such interest. Generally speaking such 
transfer will impede the spending level in society as neither the banks nor the pension funds will use 
such  income  to  fully  pay  back  these  debt  servicing  amounts  to  the  collective  of  individual 
households;  another  partial  transfer  of  savings  from the  real  sector  use  to  the  financial  sector 
savings level.
Take the case of shares. When companies issue new shares, the amounts received will generally be 
used to expand production and employment. However when shares are started to be traded and the 
share price goes up, such event implies that additional  savings were used to acquire the shares 
without the company benefitting from the savings transfer. All in the hope that future dividends will 
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add to the income flows in subsequent years. Irrational exuberance is a well known phenomenon in 
the  equity  markets.  What  it  means  in  terms  of  savings  though,  is  that  the  additional  amounts 
pumped  into  the  price  increases  of  shares  do  not  translate  into  more  money  available  to  the 
company sector. This is the second main element of the allocation of savings for purposes which do 
not create output or jobs: another element of the financial use of savings.
The third example is house prices. When a house price increases faster than the CPI inflation level, 
especially through an actual change of ownership, the economic benefit of living in such a house 
does not change, but the economic cost does. More savings, often indirectly through the mortgage 
process,  are  allocated  to  a  fixed  asset  which  offers  no  more  comfort  than  it  did  before  the 
transaction. Again most of such savings will be kept in the financial sector by the seller and will not 
add to output or employment growth in the short run. This is the third main element of the financial  
use of savings.
The  conclusion  out  of  the  above  is  that  three  categories  of  savings:  funding  government  debt 
outstanding for more than a year, funding share price rises after a company has issued its shares and 
funding house price rises above CPI inflation levels, all lead to savings being kept in the financial 
sector rather than being used for production and consumption purposes. In the next section such use 
of savings will be compared to the supply and demand theories on which many economists base 
their philosophies.
To go from the general remarks to the specifics, Eurostat,  the European Statistical Agency,  has 
compiled the following data for the Euro area -the 17 countries within the European Union, which 
share the Euro as their currency-:
The combined government debt of the Euro area compared to GDP increased from 87.3% in 2011 
till 90.6% in 2012. Total outstanding Euro area government debt was Euro 8.60 trillion as per the 
end of 2012.
The unemployment rate for the Euro area countries was 12.2% in September 2013 at 26.872 million 
unemployed  men  and  women.  This  was  an  increase  of  996.000  from the  year  before.  Youth 
unemployment was 3.548 million as per September 2013; an increase of 8000 from a year earlier. 
Greece  had  57.3% unemployed  youth  and Spain  56.5%.  Italy  is  not  far  behind at  41% youth 
unemployment rate.
In the Euro area average house prices were down by 2.2% during the period second quarter of 2013 
as compared to the second quarter of 2012. Over the longer term the deflated house price index 
dropped from 105 in 2008 (base is 100 for 2010) till 92 as per second quarter 2013. An interesting 
article  in  the  Financial  Times  of  21  July  20131 spells  out  the  differences  between  Euro  area 
countries on house prices.
1.2 Savings equity positions do not follow supply and demand economics
In the free market philosophy a price is set when supply meets demand. Free market supporters 
claim  that  economies  should  be  ruled  on  the  basis  that  there  is  no  better  system  to  adjust 
employment, incomes and economic growth levels than to follow the “markets”.
1 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/abe207dc-f081-11e2-929c-00144feabdc0.html
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The Coin economic theory begs to differ. The difference is not in the markets for consumer goods.  
Companies  are  usually  the  most  efficient  and  effective  instruments  to  ensure  that  supply  and 
demand for consumer goods are met. The profit motive drives most of them in the right direction.
The disagreement with the free markets philosophy arises when it comes to the funding of equity 
positions  which  do  not  benefit  the  consumer  goods  and  services  companies  either  through 
additional supply (investments) or demand (consumer demand).
Firstly take government debt. 
A government’s  debt  level  could not  exist  if  it  was  not  for  the  equity level  of  savings  which 
individual households have made available to the Euro area (and other) governments. This is done 
directly by individual households as well as indirectly through life insurance companies, pension 
funds and banks, for instance. According to the latest statistics of Eurostat for government debt in 
the Euro area, Euro 8.23 trillion has been outstanding for over a year and Euro 370 billion has been 
added to the debt in 2012. 95.7% of the debt has been outstanding for over a year. In other words  
Euro 370 billion was the amount spent by Euro area governments in 2012; all of it on funding 
government expenditure in excess of government tax revenue levels and most of it on actual cash 
outlays on services rather than on servicing government debt. Euro 8.23 trillion of money from 
individual households was allocated to funding outstanding government debt from previous years. 
The latter equity allocation -savings by individual households- implies that these savings could and 
still cannot be allocated to either production or consumption. 
The demand for government funds is not based on supply and demand. Parliaments in the Euro area 
make and made their political choices on how much to spend. They might defend such expenditure 
on basis of the state of the economy, but it remains a political choice and not an economic one. No 
one in any country can force a government to borrow more or less for that matter. The Maastricht  
Treaty tried and tries to instil some fiscal discipline among EU nations, but enforcements are often 
watered down. If they had been adhered to, a situation, like in Greece and Cyprus, could never have 
arisen. 
Governments have the option to raise tax levels or to lower their expenditures. This is a choice 
which individual households do not have. The latter cannot raise their income level, but they can 
reduce their expenditure one. The choice that current Parliaments usually do not have is to write off  
their debt levels from previous years; a savings destruction method which transfers the results of the 
lack  of  proper  government  management  to  the  collective  of  individual  households:  a  highly 
unsatisfactory method.  
Another  element  which  needs  consideration  is  the  level  of  free  spending.  In  the  Euro  area 
government debt levels stood per 1 July 2012 at 96.2% of total debt outstanding as per 1 July 2013. 
Only 3.8% was the discretionary spending level for the year till 30 th June 2013. The higher the debt 
level, the lower the share is of the discretionary spending level.
Another factor is the debt level as compared to the annual output or income level. The Euro area 
government debt level has reached 92.2% of annual output or GDP level according to the latest 
data.
These two facts together: one is that 96.2% is the outstanding government debt in the Euro area 
countries has been outstanding for a period longer than one year and two is that the debt level has 
now reached 92.2% of GDP level or close to the national income level in a year.
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Under these circumstances, in a supply and demand situation, the demand for government funds 
cannot be withdrawn in any period shorter than say 70-80 years, otherwise tax payments would 
outstrip private sector income levels to such an extent that an economy would totally collapse. If the 
demand for funds cannot be shortened than the supply of savings committed to funding past excess 
government expenditure can not be withdrawn either. The concept that there would be a price for an 
imprecise 70, 80 years or longer borrowing period is quite improbable. There is also no price which 
reflects the fact that the collective of individual households cannot withdraw their savings from 
funding government debt. Again there is no price -interest rate- which reflects the borrowing period 
of 70 or more years. Individual households will never want to put money aside for such life long 
periods. To overcome this hurdle, governments, the world over, have resorted to borrow on terms 
which suit the lenders: they introduced 1, 3 and 6 months, 1, 3, 5, 10 and sometimes 25 or 30 year  
government bonds. Governments around the world have created a maturity mismatch for their own 
debt, something they do not allow their own banking system to practice -borrow short but lend long 
term-.
This government maturity mismatch practice has had serious consequences for some of the Euro 
area countries, like Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Greece for instance. Spain’s government debt 
in 2008 was less as a percentage of GDP than Germany’s. In 2008 in Spain it was 36.1% of GDP 
and for Germany it was 64.9%. Spain’s gearing ratio was substantially lower than Germany’s when 
the crisis started. Had Spain borrowed according to the maturity pattern of its government debt, its 
problems would have been substantially reduced. The situation was that it  had not done so and 
neither had any of the other Euro area countries.
If one can accept that the “price” or interest rate paid for Euro area government debt is mainly based 
on short term liquidity considerations rather than on long term solvency problems, than the possible 
adjustment  mechanisms  become  easier  to  define.  Why  would  the  people  of  Spain  have  more 
difficulty in repaying their government debt than the people of Germany as both government debts 
to GDP ratios are practically equal according to the latest statistics?  The current 2.4% interest rate 
differential between the 10 year yield on German and Spanish government bonds is no indication of 
the difference in servicing the government debt levels by the collective of individual households. 
Spanish taxpayers are just as capable to repay their country’s government debt as the German ones. 
However they cannot do it in a substantially shorter period than it would be done by Germany.
Liquidity over solvency considerations is strongly encouraged by the trading practices of banks and 
other institutions which act on behalf of the individual households. Holding on to government debt 
till maturity is discouraged by two factors: The financial regulators have decided that, accounting 
wise, government bond portfolios need to be marked-to-market by the banks and other bond holders 
which fall under their supervision. The second incentive for banks to trade is that bond turnover 
usually leaves the customer poorer and the banks richer. Banks have extensive government bond 
trading operations. Furthermore the swapping of long term fixed interest rates into floating rates and 
vice versa is another money spinner for banks.
The accounting rules and the banks’ own interests’ push government bond markets into an area for 
which is was never designed: short term over long term considerations. How such dilemma can be 
counter acted will be explained in section 3.
Secondly take shares.
Companies list their shares on the stock markets, mainly to have access to the substantial savings 
resources which such markets can offer. Once the new issue has been done and the initial transfer of 
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savings has taken place, trading in shares commence. Trading offers a minute by minute price of the 
shares. According to free market economists such trading reflects the supply and demand for shares.
The Coin economic theory does not dispute that there is a “price” for the shares, but the price 
reflects an allocation of savings. The higher the price as compared to the issue price, the higher the 
level of savings which has been used for the purchase of the shares, after  the issue date.  Such 
savings do not contribute to funds available to the companies; they only reflect a transfer of savings 
to financial values, rather than to productive ones. Such share transactions are not based on the 
demand  for  funds  from the  real  sector  companies.  They  are  only  based  on  perceived  values. 
Therefore the supply of savings for supporting share price increases do not qualify for a proper 
supply and demand theory as companies play no direct role in the demand for funds. The real sector 
and the financial sector are diverging. Savings allocated to share price increases do not support the 
company sector in their  operations.  Such savings do not support real markets  where goods and 
services are produced and consumed. They constitute a financial use of savings.
Thirdly take the housing markets
Savings used to acquire homes would easily fulfil the supply and demand equation, or would they? 
Again there is a price for which a home changes hands. If the home was newly built,  it  would 
represent  the labour and material  costs  plus the homebuilders’  margin;  all  elements  of the real 
sector. However the percentage of newly built homes as compared to the stock of homes is often 
around 1 or 2% maximum, as currently new homes are likely to last well over 100 years. Therefore 
most transactions take place with existing homes. If an existing home is sold at the same price for 
which it was built, corrected for CPI inflation levels, than the savings allocated to acquire the home 
do not change in real terms. However if house price inflation exceeds the CPI inflation level than 
the additional savings used do not acquire more comfort but only fund the price difference between 
the original price in real terms and the inflated price. To consider the housing market as a supply 
and demand market is far fetched in that close to 99% of all homes in such a market have already  
been built  and will not need to be knocked down. There are, of course, changing needs due to 
family size, population growth and taste, but the 1% in additional supply cannot possibly result in 
the variation in house prices as one can observe for Spain, The Netherlands and France in 2013. 
Various sources indicate that average house prices in Spain will drop by 7.8%, in the Netherlands 
by 5.9% and in France by 5% all in this year 2013. 
Most individual households, especially young individuals and families, need a mortgage to get on to 
the property ladder. When house prices are dropping, the institutions which are supposed to help 
families -the banks- are reconsidering their policies to grant mortgages in order to avoid loan losses. 
When house prices are rising the opposite is the case. Boom and bust is the typical pattern of the 
housing markets in most countries. Local Spanish estimates are that 3.4 million homes stand empty2 
in Spain out of a total housing stock of 25.2 million homes. On top of this the current number of 
individual  households  stands  at  17.392  million,  which  reflects  a  drop  of  80.000  households 
compared to a year ago due to net migration. In the past the Spanish banking sector -especially the 
regional banks: the Caja’s- have used individual households’ savings to facilitate the construction of 
all these homes without any real need for these homes. It represented a misallocation of savings on 
a grand scale, for which the collective of individual households in Spain has been forced to pay the 
bills.
The  conclusion  out  of  the  above  is  that  an  excessive  increase  in  house  price  rises  is  usually 
accompanied by an excessive mortgage growth. Savings are allocated to a process which allows 
existing homes to be sold for a “price”, which contains a substantial speculative element. As 99% of 
2 http://www.spanishpropertyinsight.com/2013/04/22/census-shines-light-on-spains-empty-housing-problem/
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all  homes  have  already  been  built,  such  speculative  element  does  nothing  else  than  reflect  a 
financial use of savings rather than an economic one. The situation gets worse with excessive drops 
in house prices. The outstanding debt will still have to be serviced over a declining asset value. 
High unemployment rates and wages growth below inflation levels create further elements which 
help to distort the average home price. House prices are linked to individual households’ incomes 
rather  than  to  the  supply  and  demand  levels.  Nearly  all  of  the  housing  supply  dates  back  to 
economic activities in previous years. 
1.3 Losses to savings
Just like gains were classified in the above as financial gains and real sector gains, losses to savings  
can also be classified into two categories: the economic losses and the losses in financial values. To 
properly understand the importance of this distinction is to understand what happens to the savings 
in the way they have been allocated over various uses. In the previous sections the question was 
asked: do the savings allocated to a particular use help output and employment growth?
An  economic  loss  occurs  when  such  savings  do  not  add  to  output  and  employment  growth. 
Government debt outstanding for over a year, share price increases after the stock market listings 
and house price rises over and above CPI inflation levels all do not add to output and employment 
growth. In the case of government debt, of course the holders of such debt are compensated: they 
earn an income; however such income is paid for by the collective of individual households either 
in taxes or in an additional supply of savings to a government. If taxes were used to pay for past 
debt servicing, it is a zero sum game. If additional borrowings were used to pay for outstanding 
government debt, the increased borrowing level adds to the economic loss: fewer funds can be made 
available for output and employment growth.
For  share price  movements  after  the initial  share issue and for house price increases  the same 
reasoning applies. The gains of some households are funded by other households giving up part of 
their savings to fund such gains; this reflects an economic loss as these savings were not used to 
help output and employment growth.
The crux of the argument is that the financial gains for some individual households can at the same 
time reflect a loss to the economy; a loss to the collective of individual households. Savings are 
being allocated for uses which do not create employment and output growth.
Economists, politicians, bankers and regulators are not used to the fact that a gain can at the same 
time reflect a loss. A temporary misallocation of savings -an allocation of savings which does not  
contribute to employment and output growth- creates a lost opportunity to enhance employment 
growth  and  output.  This  situation  is  not  just  a  theoretical  lost  opportunity;  it  means  higher 
unemployment levels, less real sector company profits and less goods and services available to all 
individual households.
2 Appropriate economic policy responses
2.1 The re-balancing of the savings allocations
What the currently used economic policies do not do and as things stand to-day cannot do is to 
change the flow of savings towards economic  savings: savings which support employment  and 
output growth. It requires a temporary re-balancing of the savings flows.
Take fiscal policy. 
9
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Every government has to deal with a government debt which has been built up over a number of 
years. For the Euro area the GDP at market prices was Euro 9.265 trillion in 2008 and it increased 
to  Euro 9.483 trillion over 2012:  a nominal  increase of 2.35% over this  four year  period.  The 
government debt level increased from Euro 6.422 trillion in 2008 for the same group of countries, 
till  Euro 8.596 trillion in 2012: an increase of 39.5%. The government revenues were increased 
from 44.8% of GDP in 2008 till 46.3% in 2012 or in absolute amounts from Euro 4.151 trillion in 
2008 till Euro 4.391 trillion in 2012, an increase of 5.77%. 
The result of an increase in net government borrowings of Euro 2.174 trillion over the years 2008-
2012 resulted in a GDP growth of Euro 218 billion plus an increase in unemployed persons from 
12,976,000 as per December 2008 till 19,447,000 as per September 2013. This was an increase of 
49.9% in the number of unemployed over a very short period. The savings allocation of Euro 2.174 
trillion led only to an output growth of Euro 218 billion, plus a loss of 6,471,000 jobs.
A fast growth in government debt and a rapidly rising number of the unemployed with a very slow 
growth in GDP does not indicate that the allocation of savings was particularly effective, to say the 
least. It was also accompanied by an increased average tax burden as compared to GDP growth.
The real  reason for this  sad state  of affairs  is  that  governments  in  the Euro area,  and in  other  
countries in the world for that matter, still think in terms of solving economic problems through 
their own actions -fiscal policies for instance- rather than through other means. A  Euro area debt 
increase of nearly 12 times the increase in output shows a clear misallocation of savings over the 
last four years.
A tinkering in the margin is insufficient in addressing the major problems of a government debt 
increase and unemployment growth. In the next chapter various solutions will be suggested.
Take share price changes. 
The losses and gains in share prices  can be shown through two major  indices:  the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average index and the Euro Stox 50 index. In November 2007 the DJIA index reached 
14,000. In February 2009 it had dropped to 6,500 and to reach 14,000 back in February 2013 and to 
end the year 2013 at 16,480 with a two trading days to go. The Euro Stox index stood at 4,500 in 
June 2007, dropped to 2,000 in January 2009 and is currently at the level of 3,099.
What this all means in savings patterns, is that for those who sold their shares between the middle 
of 2007 and the first two months of 2009, they realised serious losses on their savings. Ever since  
early  2009,  large  sums  of  additional  savings  have  been  allocated  to  acquire  the  stocks  which 
represent these two indices.
What share prices should reflect is the longer term deterioration or improvements in the profitability 
levels of the underlying companies. What actual share prices reflect is the current perception of 
future profits. Irrational exuberance is a common phenomenon in the share markets.
One has  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  price  recorded  for  a  share  on  the  trading floor  at  
whatever time of the day and the volume of the gains or losses made on the day, or month or year.  
The daily volume traded, times its share price, reflects the gains or losses as compared to the issue 
price of the shares. One day there may be a loss to the savings levels allocated to the shares if a 
share price drops, the next day when the shares appreciate in value additional savings are needed to 
10
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acquire the shares. The loss made in savings by some investors on day one is not compensated for 
by the additional savings needed to acquire the increased value of the shares traded the next day. 
Only those shareholders who did not trade would not have experienced a real savings’ gain or loss.
In terms of economic loss -funds not channelled to output or employment growth-, both the realised 
share price loss plus the additional allocation of savings to get share prices to rise again, represent 
an economic loss as neither the actual loss on savings and the new allocation of savings to cause 
share prices to rise helps companies to increase output and employment levels. Again the concept of 
gains and losses should be seen in the context as to what happens to the savings allocated to make 
such gains or losses and whether they helped output or employment growth.
Take house prices
Just like share price losses, a lower level of realised sales price of houses reflect an actual loss of 
savings. On top of this, a realised sale of a house for which the price has risen faster than the  
original house price plus CPI inflation level, reflects an allocation of savings which has no benefit 
to output or employment growth. This statement has to be classified somewhat in that it remains 
true until the seller starts using the funds for consumption purposes and than only for the actual  
amounts allocated to consumption.
 
2.2 The size of the economic losses to savings
In the case of government debts, it is quite simple to assess the size of the misallocation of savings.  
Statistics, which provide the details, are readily available for nearly all countries. Secondly many 
governments have a tendency to continue running deficits to cover their expenses.
For shares transactions, such assessment is more difficult as shares may be traded by the institutions 
acting on behalf  of individual  households, such as pension funds, life insurance companies and 
mutual funds. Financial losses and gains are recorded, but not the accumulative effects of an initial 
loss  to  savings  and the  subsequent  allocation  of  other  or  new savings.  Pension  funds and life 
insurance companies generally continue to receive new savings out of incomes on a continuing 
basis. Pension funds, of course, return some of these savings to the group of retired people over the 
life time of the retirees.
A house price misallocation  of  savings occurs  both in the downward spiral  of house prices  -a 
savings destruction process- as well as in the upward movement, when house prices rise faster than 
the CPI inflation level. Both represent economic losses. If an individual household downsizes, the 
freed capital is usually used for consumption but over an extended period. Only the return from 
savings to actual consumption reflects an economic gain.
2.3 The economic process
The mis-allocation of savings process is not a self correcting process. In a previous paper: “The 
world’s dream: economic growth revisited”3 I have drawn attention to how in the U.S. the mis-
allocation process started. For clarity sake it is repeated here:
“Over  the  period  2000-2006  in  the  United  States  the  combined  mortgage  debt  of  individual 
households increased from $4.814 trillion as per the year-end 2000 till $9.874 trillion as per the end 
of  2006,  an  increase  of  105.1%. Over  the  same period  the  median  income level  of  individual  
3 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50190/
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households moved up in nominal terms from $41,186 in 2000 till $47,262 in 2006, an increase of 
14.75%. If one takes into account the increase in the number of individual households from 104.705 
million  in  the  year  2000 till  114.384 million  in  2006 than the  average  amount  of  outstanding 
mortgage debt moved up from $45,977 in 2000 till $86,323 in 2006; an increase of 87.75%. The 
conclusion can be drawn that mortgage debt expanded by a factor practically six times faster than 
medium  income  levels.  This  excessive  speed  of  lending  for  home  buying  purposes  plus  the 
packaging of such home loans into daily tradable mortgage backed securities lies at the heart of the 
causes for the 2008 financial crisis.”
The same paper showed the extent that the house price inflation exceeded the CPI inflation levels 
and how the annual increase in outstanding mortgage amounts (use of savings) funded such excess. 
In table 1 below such excess has been illustrated for the period 1996-2008.
Table 1: U.S.  Mortgages  outstanding 1996-2008,  annual increments in mortgage amounts, 
house price changes and consumer price inflation levels.
Year ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 2000 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 07 ‘08
Total U.S.
Mortgage
portfolio
x US $
trillion
3.54 3.75 4.05 4.43 4.81 5.30 5.98 6.83 7.81 8.91 9.90 10.58 10.5
Year on
Year
increase
x US$
billion
House
Price
Inflation
% y.o.y
CPI
Inflation
% y.o.y
Excess
HPI over
CPI %
218
2.24
2.95
-0.7
216
5.10
2.29
2.81
301
4.61
1.53
3.08
377
5.81
2.16
3.65
383
7.67
3.25
4.42
507
6.04
2.77
3.27
680
6.48
1.56
4.92
850
7.29
2.23
5.06
944
11.08
2.59
8.49
1099
10.44
3.28
7.16
990
3.33
3.12
0.21
683
-1.95
2.77
-4.72
-57
-13.3
3.70
-17
Table 2 shows the annual level of new housing starts in the U.S. The data from tables 1 and 2 show 
a strong correlation between the annual increase in outstanding mortgage amounts and the level of 
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such housing starts. One should not be surprised by such a correlation. However from 2002 till the 
beginning of 2006 the level of housing starts  accelerated accompanied by house price inflation 
levels far exceeding the CPI levels. The mis-allocation of savings took place ever since 1998 and 
continued unabated till 2007. In table 3 the amounts of net new mortgage borrowings is set off 
against the number of housing starts for each year from 1996-2008 as well as the CPI value of the 
new housing starts.
Table 2: U.S. annual new housing starts4 per 1 July, seasonally adjusted over the period 2000-
2013
Year Housing starts
x 1,000
Year Housing starts
x 1,000
2000 1463 2007 1354
2001 1670 2008  923
2002 1655 2009  594
2003 1897 2010  546
2004 2002 2011  623
2005 2054 2012  741
2006 1737 2013 (1 August)  883 (annualised)
Table 3: U.S. Net new mortgage amounts divided by new housing starts for the period 1996-
2007 and same housing starts and average mortgage amounts on a CPI based basis (1996 = 
100)
Year Housing
Starts x
million
Increase in
Mortgage 
amount U.S. $ x 
billion
Average increase
Per new House
U.S. $
Average
Per new House
On CPI base
(1996 = 100)
1996 1.472 218 148,098 148,098
1997 1.437 216 150,313 152,467
1998 1.698 301 177,267 154,800
1999 1.669 377 225,883 158,143
2000 1.463 383 261,791 163,282
2001 1.670 507 303,593 167,806
2002 1.655 680 410,876 170,424
2003 1.897 850 448,076 174,224
2004 2.002 944 471,528 178,737
2005 2.054 1,099 535,053 184,599
2006 1.737 990 569,948 190,359
2007 1.354 683 504,431 195,632
2008   .923 - 57 negative 202,870
Out of table 3 one can easily deduct the excess of savings which went into the U.S. housing market.
4 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/HOUST.txt
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For instance for 2005 $719.8 billion mortgage borrowings (savings) out of the $1,099 billion of the 
increase in mortgage amounts were allocated for no other purpose than to push up house prices or in 
other words 65.5% of savings were used for financial rather than for an economic use. The same 
percentage applied for 2006. The financial use of savings far outstripped the economic one. The 
main cause of the 2008 financial crisis is here for all to see. The securitisation process of such 
mortgages; the extended sale of such mortgage backed securities to overseas parties; the accounting 
rules which turned valuation on a mark-to-market basis into a farce as liquidity for such bonds were 
not  maintained by the banks which sold such mortgage  bonds in  the first  place,  all  led to  the 
collapse  of  the  mortgage  bond  markets.  In  the  U.S.  in  the  period  2004-2012  21.4  million 
households, out of the 53 million households which had a mortgage, were affected by foreclosure 
proceedings and 5.4 million households had their home repossessed. The reaction of the collective 
of American individual households was to reduce the total outstanding national mortgage portfolio 
from $10.5 trillion in 2008 till $9.3 trillion as per the end of the second quarter of 2013. The $1.2 
trillion was mainly paid out of incomes, as those who could afford to buy a property outright would 
most  likely have done so and interest  rates were very unattractive over this  period.  The whole 
winding  down  process  of  the  U.S.  housing  market  including  the  $1.2  trillion  repayment  of 
outstanding principal  amount  diverted  incomes  away from consumer  demand.  It  was  a  savings 
destruction process on a large scale.
The U.S. case has been analysed as it has shown many similarities with the Euro area. The ripples 
from the  U.S.  recession  blew over  to  Europe through less  growth in  international  trade,  stock 
markets which took a dive and government deficits which were or already had been blown out of 
the water, like in Greece.
What comes out of all of the above is that the process of the allocation of savings needs to be  
managed. In the case of the U.S. housing market, the free market principles did not lead to output 
and employment growth, but rather to the opposite economic position. Governments are generally 
not in the best position to re-allocate savings, as they -as politicians who want to be re-elected- have 
a self interest in preserving their spending powers rather than lowering the costs of government 
operations. Governments’ extensive use of diverting savings flows into funding past government 
deficits and their habits of borrowing short in order to lend long term to themselves do not serve 
economies well.
Central banks have also had difficulties in finding their appropriate role.  Banking supervision has 
shown many flaws, which have now culminated in about $130 billion in fines for the world banking 
sector  and still  counting.  But  who supervises the supervisors?  The key process of Quantitative 
Easing, which in the U.S. has taken over about 20% of U.S. government debt outstanding with the  
public and in the U.K. about 32% of the U.K.’s government debt,  has not led to strong output 
growth or employment growth. Also the side effects of low and for a number of years below CPI 
inflation level of interest rates were not all positive. The bank bail-outs and the requirements to 
banks to strengthen their equity base do the opposite of what low interest rates are supposed to 
bring about:  increased lending to companies, large and small. Fines paid to the regulators do not 
help either.
In my view the emphasis should be shifted towards the Collective of Individual Households -the 
Coin economic theory-. The ability of individual households to get their own income, expense and 
savings accumulation back under control, is quite astounding. However in their efforts individual 
households find regulatory and managerial obstacles on their path which they cannot overcome.
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For the Euro area, which shares a common currency; the Euro, international trade flows are not 
enough  to  restore  output  and  employment  growth.  The  current  diversion  of  savings  to  fund 
government debt, the drop in share prices since 2008 and the drop in house prices in most Euro area 
countries  with  the  exception  of  Germany  and  Austria  has  not  helped  but  rather  hindered  the 
individual households to get back on their feet.
There are options to shorten the adjustment period and to get output and employment levels to 
grow, based on the concept  of the re-balancing of the allocation  of savings.  In the subsequent 
sections  the  following  options  will  be  discussed:  economic  easing,  bank  reforms,  government 
funding structures,  intra  country assistance  among Euro area countries  and the path back from 
quantitative easing. However before addressing these options two other issues need to be discussed: 
the practice of quantitative easing and the difference in legal structure between banks and pension 
funds.
2.4 Quantitative easing
Central banks in the U.S., the U.K. and the Euro area have practised some form of quantitative 
easing (QE). Central banks have created money, not out of income but by using the printing press. 
The concept of savings is not applicable to such money created. However its impact has been felt in 
three ways: 
• Money (not savings) was invested in mainly government bonds. The acquisition of these 
bonds meant that the sellers had received cash -which appeared like savings- and had to 
find another outlet for such cash. In the meantime governments in the U.S., the U.K. and 
the Euro area continued to incur substantial amounts of additional debt. The government 
debt increase for the Euro area was Euro 2.174 trillion from 2008-2012, for the U.K. a £630 
billion debt increase from fiscal year 2008 till fiscal year 2013, for the U.S. an increase of 
government debt of $4.707 trillion from fiscal year 2008-2012. The total amount used for 
QE in the U.K. was £325 billion. In the U.S. the QE exercise did pump $2.3 trillion into the 
banking sector.  For  the  Euro  area  different  methods  were  used  which  did  not  actually 
acquire  outstanding  government  debt,  but  temporarily  funded  such  debt  titles.  The 
conclusion is that QE did not actually pump funds into output or employment growth. This 
was not due to the Central Banks’ own actions, but due to the actions of their respective  
governments in increasing their debt levels faster than QE did compensate for.
• What QE did do was to substantially lower long term government bond yields. For a long 
period between 2008 and December 2013 the 10 year yields became negative in terms of 
yield after CPI inflation. Currently in all areas a small positive margin over inflation has 
been reached. The effects on Defined Benefit pension schemes have been devastating. The 
promise  of an inflation proof pension meant  that  employers  had to fork out  substantial 
amounts of cash to support their schemes. Such “labour costs” plus the recession period 
meant that disposable incomes grew less than CPI inflation levels.
The Confederation of British Industry did a survey (published 10 December 2013)5 on the impact of 
low interest rates on their members’ ability to invest. The following conclusions were provided:
• More than two thirds of respondents (70%) with DB schemes report that their cost is having 
an impact on business investment, rising to 78% among manufacturers.
5 http://www.cbi.org.uk/media-centre/press-releases/2013/12/business-investment-being-stifled-by-cost-of-defined-
benefit-pension-schemes-cbi-standard-life-survey/
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• Almost half of respondents (46%) report that operating a DB scheme is restricting their 
ability to borrow with six in ten firms stating that employer debt regulations are hampering 
internal corporate restructurings, M&A activity and asset sales.
• However, DB provision seems to have stabilised following the upheavals of the financial 
crisis. The majority of businesses (64%) don’t plan to make any changes.
• The cost of DB remains a massive challenge. The primary concern of respondents (97%) is 
the impact of market volatility on funding positions, with 84% reporting that the funding 
level of the scheme is a concern.
• The result is that nearly nine in ten businesses (88%) are concerned about the prospects of 
contributions going up in their next funding agreement with trustees.
• The  number  of  respondents  that  are  not  satisfied  with  the  Pensions  Regulator’s  (tPR) 
dealings with their company has more than doubled (28% in 2012 from 12% in 2011).
• Eight out of ten businesses have yet to see a change in behaviour from tPR or trustees since 
the introduction of the new statutory objective – businesses are hoping the new code of 
practice will change this.
The conclusion is that QE transferred non-savings cash to banks and other institutions. This cash 
was more than absorbed by the increase in government borrowings in the two countries and one 
region. On a net basis no savings were transferred to either the consumers or the business sectors in 
the  U.S.,  the  U.K.  and the  Euro area.  What  did have  an impact  were  the lower  interest  rates.  
However this impact was negative for larger companies which support DB schemes. Evidence in 
the United States, but also from other countries, has shown that SME’s did generally not benefit 
either. Banks were reluctant to lend due to all the pressures from the regulators to increase their  
equity capital levels plus the hang-over from previous loan losses. QE was an ineffective tool to 
induce companies to produce more and for the consumers to consume more. Perhaps also Central 
Banks  encounter  limits  in  their  abilities  to  steer  savings  into  economic  activities  through their 
monetary policies.
2.5 The participants in the savings allocation process
One may wonder why a pension fund is generally not organized as a company, but as a foundation 
or trust fund. Banks, life insurance companies and mutual funds are -and nearly all have been- set  
up as companies. All four institutions allocate savings of the individual households to the various 
uses for such savings. Why should there be a profit motive for the latter and not for the pension 
funds or why are banks, insurance companies and mutual funds not organised like pension funds. 
What these asset allocation organisations have in common is that they all receive all their funds 
directly or indirectly from the collective of individual households. What they also have in common 
is that each organisation has to place the funds with various users; a government, a company or an 
individual  household,  the  latter  mostly  for  the  purpose  of  mortgage  lending.  Shares,  bonds, 
mortgage backed securities are instruments all of them use or have used as instruments to place 
their  funds. Currency swaps are widely used if foreign assets are acquired.  The only difference 
between a bank and the other institutions is not one of principle, but one of semantics. Banks can 
take deposits; officially the other entities only receive savings.  Deposits are savings but with a 
specific time period attached, which really is a very minor difference.
The real question is: do banks do a better job if they are organised in a company structure or do 
pension funds trustees do a worse job as they are not organised as a company. The experience is 
that the write downs on doubtful debtors and the mis-selling scandals as well as the extra-ordinary 
remuneration levels for some bankers do not inspire confidence in the bank company structure. In 
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general the collective individual households are the ones, who pay when things go wrong, not the 
bank managements or governments. In section 3.3 a suggestion is made for how to turn banks as 
companies more into banks as service entities to the collective of individual households.
What applies to banks equally applies to insurance companies and to mutual funds. It also applies to 
credit  card  companies  and payday  lenders  to  mention  just  a  few of  the  other  financial  sector 
companies.
3. The way forward
3.1 Introduction
What comes out of all of the above is that the allocation of savings needs to be re-balanced from 
time to time; it needs to be managed. In the case of the U.S.’ housing market,  the free market 
principles  did not  lead to  output  and employment  growth,  but rather  to  the opposite  economic 
position.  Governments  are  generally  not  in  the  best  position  to  re-allocate  savings  as  they  -as 
politicians who want to be re-elected- have a self interest in preserving their spending powers rather 
than lowering the costs of government operations. Governments’ extensive use of diverting savings 
flows into funding past government deficits and their habits of borrowing short in order to lend long 
term to themselves do not serve economies well.
Central banks have also had difficulties in finding their appropriate role.  Banking supervision has 
shown many flaws, which have now culminated in about $130 billion in fines for the world banking 
sector  and still  counting.  But  who supervises the supervisors?  The key process of Quantitative 
Easing,  which  in  the  U.S.  at  the  time  has  taken  over  about  20%  of  U.S.  government  debt 
outstanding with the public and in the U.K. about 32% of the U.K.’s government debt, has not led 
to strong output or employment growth. Also the side effects of low and for a number of years  
below  CPI  inflation  level  of  interest  rates  were  not  all  positive.  The  bank  bail-outs  and  the 
requirements to banks to strengthen their equity base do the opposite of what low interest rates are 
supposed to  bring  about:   increased  lending  to  companies,  large  and small.  Fines  paid  to  the 
regulators do not help economic growth either.
In my view the emphasis should be shifted towards the Collective of Individual Households -the 
Coin economic  theory-.  The households’  ability  to  get  their  own income,  expense and savings 
accumulation  back  under  control,  is  quite  astounding.  However  in  their  efforts  individual 
households find regulatory and managerial obstacles on their path which they cannot overcome.
For the Euro area, which shares a common currency; the Euro, international trade flows are not 
enough to restore output  and employment  growth. This is  notwithstanding running a surplus in 
goods trade with the rest of the world.  The current diversion of savings to fund government debt, 
the drop in share prices since 2008 and the drop in house prices in most Euro area countries with the 
exception of Germany and Austria has not helped but rather hindered the individual households to 
get back on their feet.
There are options to shorten the adjustment period and get output and employment levels to grow, 
based on the concept of the need to re-balance the allocation of savings. In the subsequent sections 
the  following  options  will  be  discussed:  economic  easing,  bank  reforms,  government  funding 
structures, cross-border assistance among Euro area countries and the path back from quantitative 
easing. 
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The main aim of all these measures suggested is to get the collective of individual households to 
help themselves as this is the most efficient manner to run an economy. The main aim is to correct  
on a temporary basis the self destructive powers of an excessive allocation of savings made to a 
financial use. 
3.2 Economic easing
Individual households do not save with the purpose of seeing their savings destroyed by negative 
returns. Their aim is to see the economy grow so that savings benefit from the increased economic 
activity both by increased output and increased income levels.
In the above it has been explained that there are large volumes of savings allocated to uses which do 
not help economies grow.
If one studies the saving rate of the collective of individual households in the Euro area it has varied 
somewhat around 13.5% of individual households’ income over the period since 2002. In the U.S. 
the accumulated net worth of individual households is about 4.5 times annual GDP. In the Euro area 
there are no recent precise data on this but with a savings rate of 13.5% over a longer period of 
time, the total net worth of Euro area individual households is likely to be below the U.S. level but 
highly likely to be a low multiple of the Euro area’s GDP.
Economic easing can be defined as the process of channelling savings away from the financial use 
and to its economic one.
In countries like The Netherlands the pension reserves stand at 156% of GDP and in other Euro area 
countries like France and Germany the insurance technical reserves are all very substantial.  The 
richer countries do not lack savings, but they do lack mechanisms to channel such savings to an 
economic use.
An economic easing scheme can be applied domestically as well as cross border between countries 
in the Euro area.
3.2.1 Example of a domestic scheme: The Netherlands
In the Netherlands the pension funds have accumulated funds to the extent of 156% of GDP in 2012 
according to the Towers Watson Global Pensions asset study6 2013. This amounts to Euro 935 
billion.  The  OECD  in  their  Better  Life  statistics7 noted  that  in  the  Netherlands  the  average 
disposable income per household in 2012 was Euro 33,200 with the top 20% receiving Euro 62,648 
and the bottom 20% Euro 14,563 on average.  With slightly over 7.5 million households in the 
Netherlands the total disposable income is close to Euro 250 billion. 
To achieve the objective of transferring some savings from a financial use to its economic one, the 
collective of pension funds could be asked to spend Euro 7.5 billion a year, which is less than 1% of 
their  savings,  as  an  economic  use  injection  for  the  benefit  of  its  savers.  The Euro  7.5  billion 
translates in about Euro 1, 000 per pension saver and beneficiary. If this amount is paid out equally 
to all pension savers and beneficiaries, it will benefit the lowest 20% income group with a 6.87% 
6 http://www.towerswatson.com/en-GB/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/01/Global-Pensions-Asset-
Study-2013
7 http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/netherlands/
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income injection, the average income group with a 3% income injection and the highest income 
group with a 1.6% income injection. If the Dutch government agrees to allow this payment to be 
made tax free, it will create the maximum economic impact.
If the Dutch pension savers are requested to use these funds for consumption spending rather than 
turning them back into financial savings, a boost to domestic demand will be created which will 
have  multiplier  effects  for  the  manufacturing  and  service  sector  industry.  If  such  injection  is 
followed up in subsequent years (probably for no longer than two or three years) and  entrepreneurs 
know that such stimulus will be continued till the Dutch economy is back to its long term growth 
potential,  than the multiplier  effects will  be the strongest. With increasing output and more job 
opportunities the Dutch government’s tax revenues will increase without any change in tax rates. 
The  Dutch  government  will  also  need  fewer  savings  to  fund  its  deficit,  leaving  more  savings 
available for economic purposes. Banks will experience a lower level of doubtful debtors among its 
customer base and the outlook for the housing market becomes more positive as more households 
will be in full employment.
Why would the Dutch  pension  funds wish to  participate  in  such action?  Firstly  pension funds 
benefit if companies do better as share prices will increase. This is a financial gain, but one based 
on real output growth rather than being based on speculation only. Secondly more people will want 
to save with the pension funds as such economic easing exercise can be repeated whenever the 
savings allocation pattern gets out of balance again. Finally the Dutch government could issue a 
short-fall guarantee in case the share price increases would not cover the paid-out amounts, based 
on the 10 year government bond yield developments. Such settlement could be made three years 
after the start of the economic easing exercise. It is unlikely that pension funds will have cash-flow 
problems as a result of these pay-outs as their dividend and interest received will certainly be more 
than 1% of their  portfolio.  However to ease the cash-flow considerations,  the pay-out could be 
staggered into two semi-annual payments of Euro 500 each. Furthermore the ECB could via the 
Dutch  Central  Bank  (DNB)  make  short  term  funds  available  to  those  pension  funds,  which 
experience temporary cash-flow problems. The aim is to avoid having to sell financial assets for 
supporting economic easing.
3.2.2 A cross-border scheme in the Euro area. 
The European central bank (ECB) has as one of its main tasks to protect the value of its currency:  
the Euro. Cross-border economic easing would be one of the best ways to do so for Euro area 
countries.  What  the  ECB has  currently done is  exchanging government  bonds of  various  Euro 
countries into Euro loans for liquidity support. Such support has the same draw back as quantitative 
easing:  it  creates  liquidity  in  the  financial  savings  markets,  but  does  nothing  for  individual 
households. 
 A better alternative would be to create a transfer mechanism to get some financial savings back to 
an economic use.  This could be achieved as follows: the ECB borrows in the international financial 
markets by issuing ECB bonds. Such activity does not create money, but transfers money from one 
type of savings to another. As an example take the case of Spain: the proceeds of such bonds are 
transferred from the ECB to the Bank of Spain, Spain’s central bank. The concept is that Spain’s 
central bank will organise a distribution of the proceeds over all 17.4 million Spanish households. 
Again the principle of an equal amount of cash for each household could be applied. This will help 
the lower income level households more than the more affluent ones. It makes economic sense.
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In Spain the current average net household income level runs at Euro 23,123 in 2012 according to 
INE, Spain’s national statistical office8. This is practically 10% less than the 2005 level. To kick 
start  the economy a cash injection  of 4% in year  one over the average  net  household income, 
followed by a lower percentage a year later, would probably be the best approach. Again one fixed 
amount of Euro 925 per households would best be paid to all households, which helps the lowest 
20% of the households the most and the top 20% the least. Total costs Euro 16.1 billion in year 1. 
Again the best approach would be to allow this amount to be paid tax free. The Euro 16 billion is a  
fraction of Spain’s government deficit of Euro 109 billion over 2012, but such deficit has had no 
lasting impact on unemployment levels as it did not deal and could not deal with the substantial 
deterioration  in  individual  households’  average  income  developments.  Cross-border  economic 
easing can make the difference.
The pay back could be arranged out of general tax receipts over a ten year period including a two 
year grace one. The outstanding loan could be paid back in equal instalments over the remainder 
eight years. Of course, the expectation is that with the multiplier effects tax revenues will increase,  
without having to change the tax rates.  For Spain it  does not count as government  debt as the 
Spanish government has not incurred a government deficit to fund this transaction. It is in effect a 
collective  individual  households’  debt  to  be repaid  out of  the tax income generated  out of  the 
increased economic activities of the working population.
The ECB could  issue 10 year  index-linked bonds.  Such bonds could  be linked to  the  average 
inflation rate in the 17 Euro area countries. Such bonds have two advantages over fixed rate bonds. 
Firstly the ECB makes use of a combined inflation rate from the 17 countries sharing the Euro as 
their currency. Secondly the ECB reduces the risks to all type of investors -institutional or private- 
to see the values of the bonds fluctuate strongly in case the Euro interest rate based on the average 
inflation rate has to be increased. Especially institutional investors will benefit from this as their 
mark-to-market accounting method will not show substantial losses when interest rates rise. For 
both institutional and private investors the positive yield over inflation will bring in a cash flow 
which is more likely to be used in an economic use rather than being kept as a financial saving.
The ECB could repeat the transfer of savings from a financial use to an economic one for other 
Euro area countries, if needed. This could be done especially for those Euro area countries which 
lack the financial resources accumulated in pension funds and life insurance companies.
As a method it will bring home the message to all Euro area citizens, that the ECB is not only there  
to maintain the value of the Euro, but also to stabilise Euro area economies as and when a re-
balancing of an allocation of savings is needed. The Euro as a currency will be strengthened, but not 
unimportantly, Euro area citizens will experience a direct benefit from being a citizen in one of the 
Euro area countries.
3.3 Banking reform
Many steps have already been taken to make the ECB have more influence over the solidity of the 
banking sector in the 17 Euro area countries. An ECB based regulatory authority is to be established 
in 2014. The chairperson has already been appointed. A bank-bailout fund will be established with 
bank contributions stretching over a period of ten years.
In a previous section the question was already raised why pension funds have a different legal 
structure than banks and life insurance companies. 
8 http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/spain-household-income-drops-10-to-2005.html
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The U.K. Pension Regulator  formulates the role and responsibility of a trustee as: “It is the trustees 
Board’s legal duty to make sure that the right processes, systems, people and procedures are in 
place to manage the (pension) scheme, its investments and the risks that can arise.” 
Is it not striking that the Board of a bank has the same responsibilities as those just described for the 
trustee Board of a pension fund. Why is it than, that a Board of a bank has only to report to its  
shareholders meeting rather than to all fund providers? 
In the discussions about banking reform it has already been agreed and even practised like in the 
case of Cyprus, that other groups rather than the shareholders should feel the pain if the Board of a 
bank has made serious mistakes. For instance it has been agreed that subordinated debt holders as 
well as large depositors should pay for the mistakes of bank managements. This all with the aim to 
avoid  another  series  of  government  (or  rather  more  precisely  the  collective  of  individual 
households)  supported  bail-outs.  It  is  illogical  to  share  losses  without  having  any  say  and 
responsibility over the decisions taken. Losses made by banks are as serious as losses made by 
pension funds.
My suggestion is to gradually convert banks to something more similar to pension funds. This can 
be done by turning banks more into saving entities with an economic purpose. If one introduces 
three different risk categories: shares, subordinated bond and large deposits than it should be logical 
that the rewards warrant a different level of remuneration for each category, but there should be no 
difference in the date of payment. Bank profits should not be assessed before profit distribution, but 
after all risk categories have been paid, including shareholders. Assume shareholders receive a fixed 
interest rate over their shares, payable annually: than such shares are in effect turned into perpetual 
bonds of the highest risk category. The principal amount of the bonds may be lost but as long as the 
bank exists it has to pay out such income flows before declaring its profit levels. Subordinated 
bonds are  the  second risk taking category,  but  of a  lower risk category.  Therefore the interest 
applied should be slightly lower than for “shareholders”. Thirdly large depositors should be made 
aware that their money is also at risk and therefore their interest compensation needs to reflect this. 
Banks should be forced to publish these interest rates on their websites for all to see. For small 
depositors most countries already offer a protection scheme in case a bank fails.
Banks should no longer have “shareholder” meetings, but “risk” holder meetings where all  risk 
holders are represented. The need for additional buffer funds will show up in the “price” of shares 
and subordinated bonds on the stock markets as and when they start trading below par.
The  new Volcker  rules  will  mean  that  the  chances  of  banks  dealing  for  own account  will  be 
severely curtailed. The real beneficiaries will be the risk stakeholders as under the old system the 
risk division between the collective individual households who provided the funds and the dealers 
who put these funds out at risk was usually: a gain the dealer wins; a loss the savings providers lose. 
3.4 Government funding structures.
This section is more generally applicable than just for Euro area countries. All governments which 
borrow in the capital markets do so to fund expenditure that exceeds their government revenues. 
Such deficit funding rarely creates a cash-flow for a government in subsequent years. In the above it 
was highlighted that governments generally do not behave as ordinary borrowers. They continually 
roll-over debt on basis of a maturity mismatch. No ordinary household -either as an individual or as 
a company- could arrange such type of borrowing.
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For  the  fund providers  -the  savers-  there  are  a  number  of  risks  involved.  The first  risk is  the 
accounting risk. The regulators have decided that government bond values can only be assessed on 
a day by day value base which is the mark-to-market method. For individual holders of government 
bonds such accounting method makes no difference: one may decide to keep the bonds to maturity, 
accepts the interest rate paid over such bonds and does not worry that there may be other bonds in 
the market which pay a higher interest rate. On the other hand for personal cash flow reasons one 
may sell the bonds. For banks and pension funds however, such accounting methods are supposed 
to be essential  in reflecting fair values of assets and liabilities and of future cash outflows and 
inflows. 
The second risk is the risk of inflation. What matters for individual households and thereby for 
companies  supporting Defined Benefit  schemes as well  as for pension funds and life  insurance 
companies is whether the interest rate covers the depreciation/appreciation risks to the value of a 
bond as a consequence of the effects of CPI inflation rates? 
What government bonds should reflect but currently do not reflect is that the collective of savers 
have no option but to stay invested in government bonds for at least 70 or 80 years as any shorter 
period would imply collective economic suicide. On top of this the practice of quantitative easing 
created the situation that savers had to compete against central banks. The latter created money at 
no cost to these banks. Each government, which depends on savers to provide it with the cash to 
cover their debts, would know that the higher the debt level, the longer it will take to pay off such 
debt and the longer the commitment of the savers need to be to help out governments. 
Governments require all other financial institutions, such as banks and pension funds to have clear 
cash in and outflow analyses over the total period of their commitments, however governments fail 
to practise for themselves what they preach for others.
How can a one day sales price of a ten year bond reflect a fair value for an uncertain 70 or 80 year  
obligation? How can quantitative easing by central banks be called “fair” as the zero costs of money 
to the issuer does not compare with the economic act of giving up consumption in order to save for 
a future expense? Why do governments not recognise that their use of savings is to a very large 
extent a financial use and does not add to income or output growth after the initial year of spending 
such savings? Why is it that governments have difficulties in accepting that economic risks to the 
individual households: the risks to their real -after  inflation- income levels, affect the economic 
performance of a country? Why do governments not issue all their debt in index-linked bonds? 
Such action would prevent that incomes out of individual households’ savings will be negatively 
affected over the whole period of funding i.e. 70 or 80 years. It would do away with the question of 
fair value as a fixed reward over the prevailing inflation rate is always fair. It may create some 
difficulty for actuaries as future incomes and expenses for pension funds cannot be discounted at a 
fixed rate, as there will be no fixed rate: the rewards for savings will be a continuously floating rate 
based on the CPI inflation levels plus a fixed margin.
Perhaps Parliaments will have some time to discuss such questions as they are vital to an economy.
3.5 Pension funds contributions to economic growth  
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Pension funds,  acting as savings institutions,  have grown in importance  in many countries,  but 
especially in the U.S., the U.K., Switzerland, the Netherlands, Australia and Canada, where apart 
from Canada,  they have  all  reached a  savings  level  equal  or  over  annual  GDP levels  of  their 
respective country.
Such mass accumulation of savings does require serious thoughts about the impact of such savings 
on output and employment growth.
Pension  regulators  seem  more  worried  that  each  fund  has  the  reserves  to  pay  the  committed 
amounts  to  each  fund’s  future  pensioners,  rather  than  encouraging  these  pension  funds  to  act 
collectively in the interest  of an economy.  In the previous sections it  has been spelled out that 
imbalances can arise in which financial savings grow rapidly, but the economic use of such savings 
is negligible. Hopefully pension regulators do not only focus on fair value accounting, based on the 
wrong maturity of government debt, based on savings allocations to shares, which have no relation 
to the funds received by companies and based on the notion that individual households need to save 
more otherwise their wish to live relatively happily in retirement cannot be fulfilled.
Perhaps, pension funds themselves individually and collectively through their pension federations 
and  in  concert  with  the  pension  regulators  could  study the  savings  flows  and see  when  a  re-
balancing of such flows is required.
3.6 The path back from quantitative easing
Quantitative easing has taken place in the U.S., the U.K. and in a more indirect way in the Euro 
area. Central banks are now owners or in the case of the ECB stake holders of a substantial share of 
outstanding government debt. Central banks were never created to print money to fund government 
expenditure. They more than any other organisation were entrusted with the task to maintain the 
values of their respective currencies and to supervise the financial system with the aim to encourage 
economic growth and full employment.
To arrange for the portfolio of government bonds to be released back to the private markets a few 
principles may be taken into account.
Firstly the cause of the latest financial crisis in 2008 was the extensive home mortgage lending to 
individual  households in  the U.S.  and the subsequent  selling  method through mortgage  backed 
securities for which the sellers did not maintain a market. The latter shows the typical financial  
markets trading mentality: in good times we gain, in bad times individual households lose.
In 2001 it was mainly the dot.com bubble which was to blame for the short recession.
The latest financial crisis seriously affected individual households. Therefore a main role for central 
banks is to take measures which avoid the excessive home mortgage growth. The national home 
mortgage portfolios were not created by a single bank, though some were more aggressive than 
others. The portfolio was created by the collective of banks in the U.S., and in Spain for instance. 
Therefore, as pointed out in section 2.3, a warning system could have been put in place when more 
than  65% of  the  increase  in  mortgage  lending  went  into  house  price  rises  rather  than  in  new 
construction. Such warning system could work not by raising interest rates, but by making mortgage 
lenders pay for the excess lending. Such system can be quite simple: it can be a traffic light system 
to the mortgage providers. Green is the light for: keep lending; amber for slow down or you will 
face speeding fines and red for speeding fines, which will be assessed per lending institution on 
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basis of their incremental home mortgage activities. The same warning system should be applied to 
investment banks, which refuse to maintain a market in their financial products sold.
The traffic light system avoids individual households overstretching themselves in their borrowings. 
It  also avoids a contagion effect  to all  market  participants  including real  sector companies  and 
individual households which are the ones who to have to pay more as a consequence of the higher 
interest rates for their borrowings. Thirdly it avoids banks to have to write off a sizeable portion of 
their loan portfolios in future years. The latter hinder their lending capacity for economic purpose 
activities.
It is generally accepted that prevention works better than a cure.
The cure chosen by central banks was quantitative easing. The consequence was a serious lowering 
of interest rates, which worked well for those who had financial assets, like hedge funds, but much 
less  well  for  pension  funds  and  life  insurance  companies  and  indirectly  for  companies  which 
supported and still  support  Defined Benefit  pension schemes.  Pension funds and life  insurance 
companies not only have financial assets, but also future liabilities. When a promise of an inflation 
proof pension pay-out has been promised -a promise which governments widely practice for their 
own civil  servants  and  members  of  parliaments-  than  the  liabilities  require  an  above  inflation 
revenues flow over the assets. The only way to ensure such above inflation rewards is to change the 
debt portfolio of the largest borrower in a country with the longest maturity schedule: government 
debt. In the U.S. and in the U.K. both governments have issued index-linked (also called inflation-
linked) government bonds. In the Euro area France, Germany and Italy have done so.
To avoid the mark-to-market losses, which are inevitable for existing fixed rate government bond 
portfolios as soon as interest rates have been raised, the central banks can make a debt swap with 
the government debt issuer in order to turn the currently held fixed rate portfolios into inflation-
linked government bonds. The latter bonds are much more in character with the long term funding 
needs of governments and reduce the risks to the long term bond holders such as pension funds and 
life insurance companies. If one takes a 1% over CPI inflation as a benchmark for a 70-80 year  
government debt obligation than for the U.S., the U.K. and for the Netherlands than the evidence 
suggests that for nearly every year over the last 25 years, such inflation-linked bonds would have 
been cheaper for the respective government and thereby for the collective of individual households.
4 Conclusions
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The question was asked whether  savings promote  or hamper economic growth.  This  paper  has 
analysed savings from the perspective of savings made available to individual households and to 
goods and service sector companies for consumption and production purposes. It has separated the 
financial  sector  from the service sector as the financial  sector institutions allocate  savings over 
various uses on behalf of the collective of individual households. This allocation process has not 
been a smooth one. 
Governments  do  not  behave  like  ordinary  borrowers.  Firstly,  they  and  they  alone  among  all 
households, can raise their own income levels by increasing tax rates. Secondly their accumulated 
debt levels are funded not on basis of an expected future cash flow over the whole period that the 
debt will be outstanding, but on basis of short term borrowings which fund long term lending needs. 
No other household can borrow in such manner. Thirdly the combination of short term funding and 
long term debt exposure creates serious risks to the collective of households, especially the risks of 
below inflation yields over government bonds and the risks of mark-to-market assessments when 
interest rates come down and go back up again. The latter risk is not based on the full maturity of 
the exposure but only on a short period of it. Therefore the mark-to-market assessment provides the 
wrong guidance to financial sector institutions, which are forced to apply such accounting rules. 
Issuing a much larger volume of inflation linked government bonds will reduce such risks.
 Finally government  debt  outstanding for longer  than a year  rarely creates  a cash flow for the 
government. Its use of savings after the initial one year of spending becomes one of a financial use 
of savings rather than an economic one. Its use of savings makes it impossible to allocate such 
savings to economic growth opportunities  created by either the company sector (supply)  or the 
collective of individual households for increasing demand levels.
When companies raise funds from the stock markets, they usually do this to fund their operations: 
an economic use of savings. However when trading starts among the market participants savings are 
used to help increase share price rises and savings are lost for those market participants who sell 
below the buying price. In both cases a company does not get a penny more. Such use of savings is,  
just like government debt outstanding for over a year, a financial use of savings as no funds are 
transferred to the company itself. The price quoted bears no relation to the demand for funds from a 
company. It is a financial price rather than an economic one.
The third element is the funding of homes, especially when borrowed funds are used. In the above it 
was made clear that such use of savings can from time to time be made to enhance house price rises 
far above CPI inflation levels. Economically speaking such price rises do not reflect supply and 
demand as the money used far exceeds the costs of building new homes. In 2005 and 2006 65% of 
all savings allocated in the U.S. to the national housing market were not used for increasing the 
supply of homes, but for increasing the prices of existing homes. Such allocation of savings was yet 
another example of a financial rather than an economic use of savings. 
The conclusion is that the savings allocation process can proceed in one direction for too long, like 
in the case of the national mortgage portfolio in the U.S. and the house building programme in 
Spain.  Economic  growth  does  not  take  into  account  government  debt  levels  and  its  funding 
structure; it does not take into account share price drops and rises and it does not take into account 
house price rises above or below CPI inflation levels. However all these changes affect the savings 
allocations. The distinction between a financial use and an economic one of savings helps to make 
clear that there are periods that the financial use absorbs far more than is good for a continuing 
economic growth pattern and for full employment.
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In the above a number of options were developed of how to temporarily change the allocation of 
savings towards a more economic use. Economic easing was elaborated upon, both the domestic 
variant with the help of the local pension funds industry, or the international variant with the help of 
the ECB for the Euro area countries. A traffic light system was explained for curtailing a too rapid 
growth in lending for house buying purposes. The need for more inflation-linked bonds was set out 
as a way out of the position caused by quantitative easing. Finally the banking sector was focussed 
upon as its profit motives and shareholder structure does not tally with the risks that individual  
households run on the banks. Shares could be turned into perpetual bonds of the highest class of 
risk, whereby “dividends” are payable before a profit assessment of banks. Shareholder meetings 
should become “risk” holder meetings.
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